Case Detail
| Case Title | JORDAN v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| District | District of Columbia | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| City | Washington, DC | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Case Number | 1:2016cv01868 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Date Filed | 2016-09-19 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Date Closed | 2018-03-31 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Judge | Judge Rudolph Contreras | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Plaintiff | JACK JORDAN | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Case Description | Jack Jordan, an attorney representing a client in a case against DynCorp International under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, submitted several FOIA requests to the Department of Labor for emails forwarded by DynCorp's counsel to the administrative judge. The agency redacted records under Exemption 5 (privileges), claiming the attorney-client privilege. Jordan appealed several of the requests, which were upheld by the agency on appeal. Jordan then filed suit. Complaint issues: Litigation - Attorney's fees | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Defendant | UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Appeal | D.C. Circuit 18-5128 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Appeal | D.C. Circuit 19-5201 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Documents | Docket Complaint Complaint attachment 1 Opinion/Order [39] FOIA Project Annotation: Judge Rudolph Contreras has ruled that two emails submitted by DynCorp to the Office of Administrative Law Judges at the Department of Labor in a case brought under the Defense Base Act contain attorney-client privileged information and were properly withheld from Jack Jordan, an attorney representing his wife Maria against DynCorp International, under Exemption 4 (confidential business information), rather than the more obvious legal privilege claims in Exemption 5 (privileges). The circumstances of the case present a rather peculiar instance in which the agency relied on the "commercial or financial information [that is] privileged" protection in Exemption 4, rather than the more common claim that the information is commercially confidential and would cause competitive harm to the submitter if disclosed. Administrative Law Judge Larry Merck, who was hearing the DBA case, reviewed the emails in camera and ruled that they were protected by the attorney-client privilege and were not available in discovery. Perhaps faced with that reality, Jordan resorted to requesting them under FOIA. While by their very description the emails appear to be clearly privileged, because they were neither inter- or -intra-agency records, they did not qualify for those privileges incorporated under Exemption 5. But to the extent the emails could be considered commercial, they did qualify for a privilege claim under Exemption 4. Contreras relied on Baker & Hostetler v. Dept of Commerce, 473 F. 3d 312 (D.C. Cir. 2006), to explain the meaning of commercial interest. He indicated that in Baker & Hostetler the D.C. Circuit had given commercial interest "a broad definition, one that includes records that 'reveal basic commercial operations,' 'relate to the income-producing aspects of a business,' or bear upon the 'commercial fortunes of the organization." He observed that 'like in Baker, the information in the DynCorp emails bears directly upon the 'commercial fortunes' of DynCorp as a company because this information addresses a business contract of the company." Jordan argued that Labor was trying to use a commercial interest privilege when it was clear that the emails, to the extent that they were privileged at all, were protected by a legal privilege. But Contreras indicated that "'privileged' information is generally understood to be information that falls within recognized constitutional, statutory, or common-law privileges" and added that "though 'case law examining privilege under Exemption 4 is sparse,' courts have repeatedly found that Exemption 4's 'privilege' requirement covers properly-practiced attorney-client privilege. Though 'the mere fact that an attorney is listed as a recipient. . . does not make a document protected under [attorney-client] privileged,' confidential disclosures between an attorney and her client regarding factual and legal matters are certainly protected by attorney-client privilege." Applying these standards to the two emails, Contreras found that the agency's description of one of the emails "supports the inference that the DynCorp emails concern contractual information that DynCorp wishes to protect and thus this contractual information was sent to [its] in-house attorney for his legal advice." Contreras, however, found the confidential privilege claim covering the second email more tenuous because that email did not appear to deal directly with legal advice. He asked the agency to provide more information before ruling on whether the second email qualified as privileged under Exemption 4. Trying to undercut the legitimacy of the DynCorp privilege claim, Jordan argued that DynCorp had waived its privilege by submitting the emails to the ALJ and allowing him to review them in camera. Contreras rejected the claim. He noted that "ALJs are judicial actors who, in the matters pending before them, must make determinations on the propriety of privilege claims asserted by the parties before them. There is no basis to conclude that they may not avail themselves of in camera review as a useful tool in making those determinations. If submission of information to such review jettisoned privilege, the review would have no purpose, because any privileged document submitted for in camera review would be immediately eligible for full disclosure under FOIA." He added that "Mr. Jordan unjustifiably disregards the fact that DynCorp submitted its emails for in camera review to validate its claim of privilege in accordance with an ALJ order. DynCorp's submission was consistent with attorney-client confidentiality and did not constitute a waiver of privilege. Indeed, ALJ Merck found that the attorney-client privilege applied, bolstering the Court's holding that the review process alone did not waive the privilege." Contreras rejected Jordan's claim that the agency should have segregated and disclosed the notation "Subject to Attorney-Client Privilege." Noting that even by Jordan's own logic the phrase provided no meaningful information, Contreras pointed out that "the Court will not adopt a rule that requires agencies 'to parse [privileged] emails, letters and general conversations on a statement-by-statement basis to determine which sentences or even clauses were protected and which were not' when there is no indication that the clauses have any substantive meaning." Aside from his FOIA claims, Jordan also leveled a number of Rule 11 sanction motions against the agency's attorney. Finding all his sanction motions bordered on the frivolous, Contreras noted that "the Court reminds Mr. Jordan that 'Rule 11 is not a toy.' Sanctioning the conduct of a litigant is a solemn endeavor. The Court admonishes Mr. Jordan to 'think twice' before moving for sanctions in the future. Mr. Jordan's cavalier approach to sanctions motions could result in him being sanctioned himself."
Opinion/Order [60]Issues: Exemption 4 - Competitive harm FOIA Project Annotation: After dismissing Jack Jordon's persistent demands that he recuse himself because he was biased or reverse his previous ruling in favor of the Department of Labor, Judge Rudolph Contreras has resolved the remaining FOIA issues in a case brought by Jordan for communications made by DynCorp International during an administrative proceeding in which Jordan was representing his wife Maria in a labor dispute with DynCorp International. By the time of his first decision, the case had boiled down to whether two emails that originated with DynCorp were privileged under Exemption 4 (confidential business information). While Contreras found that the confidentiality prong of Exemption 4 applied to the emails, he concluded that, without further justification from the agency, only one of the emails qualified under the attorney-client privilege. He told the agency to either disclose the second email or to better justify its privilege claim. In response, DOL supplemented its affidavits in an attempt to show the second email was privileged as well. This time, Contreras rejected the agency's claim. He noted that "here, DOL seems to argue that [the email sent by Robert Huber, who was DynCorp's Senior Contracts Director] qualifies for protection under the attorney-client privilege because it was sent as part of DynCorp's broader efforts to address a legal issue and because it was sent to an in-house attorney to provide him 'with a complete understanding of the facts relevant to the matter that was being discussed in the email.'" Rejecting that claim, Contreras pointed out that "it is difficult to say, under the circumstances of this case, that one of the primary purposes of the Huber email was to obtain legal advice. The email is specifically directed to another person �" a non-attorney �" and the email specifically (and only) seeks information from that person. It is not at all apparent from DOL's submission how Mr. Huber's request that [the non-attorney] provide certain information might in any way shape [DynCorp's in-house attorney's] legal advice on the business contract or any other legal matter. DOL's contention that some broader legal problem existed in the background is insufficient to connect this specific communication to that legal problem or to any prospective legal problem. [Further], the Huber email does not appear to contain any factual information on which the [in-house attorney] might rely to form a legal judgment." He added that "the Huber email's topic and distribution list appears to be nearly identical to that of the final email in the chain, which was not withheld on the basis of attorney-client privilege. The only difference between the two emails is that the Huber email was copied to an attorney while the final email in the chain was not. . .Simply copying an attorney on a communication does not make that communication privileged."
Opinion/Order [72]Issues: Exemption 5 - Privileges - Attorney-client privilege FOIA Project Annotation: Judge Rudolph Contreras has once again rejected Jack Jordan's attempts to argue that he was entitled to an email sent by an official at DynCorp that contained privileged information and became part of the record of an administrative law judge at the Department of Labor after finding that none of Jordan's multiple challenges for reconsideration under Rule 60 of the Rules for Civil Procedure entitled him to relief. Jordan represented his wife in a Defense Base Act suit against DynCorp International. During that litigation, Jordan learned of the existence of two emails that had become part of the DOL proceeding. He requested the emails under FOIA and while Contreras found that one of the emails was not covered by the attorney-client privilege, he ruled that the other email was privileged. Jordan appealed to the D.C. Circuit, which summarily upheld Contreras' ruling. Jordan then filed suit in the Western District of Missouri as well, arguing that the emails should be turned over. That judge agreed with Contreras' original ruling and dismissed Jordan's attempt to relitigate the issues in the Western District of Missouri. The judge also dismissed Jordan's motion for reconsideration, finding he presented no new evidence supporting the motion. Now, Contreras, while entertaining a slightly different approach under Rule 60, which allows a party to be relieved from summary judgment, has reached the same conclusion. One of Jordan's primary contentions was that the D.C. Circuit had actually ruled that the emails were not privileged because the emailer's request for legal advice contained nothing more than disjointed words that would have minimal or no information content. Contreras, however, pointed out that "this is not what the Circuit held. . .The Circuit did not find that the request for privilege consisted of disjointed words without information content, but rather held that disclosing parts of the email that demonstrate its privileged nature would constitute the disclosure of disjointed words without information content."
Issues: Litigation - Jurisdiction - Failure to State a Claim | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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