Case Detail
| Case Title | CTR FOR INTL ENVIRON v. OFC. U.S. TRADE REP., et al | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| District | District of Columbia | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| City | Washington, DC | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Case Number | 1:2001cv00498 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Date Filed | 2001-03-07 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Date Closed | 2012-02-29 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Judge | Judge Richard W. Roberts | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Plaintiff | CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT LAW | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Defendant | OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Defendant | ROBERT B. ZOELLICK in his official capacity as the United States Trade Representative | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Appeal | D.C. Circuit 12-5136 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Documents | Docket Opinion/Order [40] FOIA Project Annotation: Judge Richard Roberts has ruled that the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative has failed to adequately show how disclosure of several documents pertaining to U.S. proposals prepared for the Negotiating Group on Investment, part of the Free Trade Agreement for the Americas, would harm foreign relations and, as a result, has not yet substantiated withholding the records under Exemption 1 (national security). The Center for International Environmental Law had requested records pertaining to definitions of some terms used in the negotiations. The agency identified 46 responsive documents, withholding them all under Exemption 5 (deliberative process privilege). The Center accepted that all but four of the records were properly withheld under Exemption 5, but continued to contest that the remaining four documents were improperly withheld under Exemption 1. USTR claimed the remaining documents were properly classified as confidential because disclosure might harm foreign relations and national security and because the documents pertained to negotiations that were expected to be maintained in confidence. Finding the agency's affidavits inadequate, Roberts noted that "USTR principally relies on [two] declarations, neither of which demonstrates a strong nexus between the release of the documents and harm to United States foreign policy. Although both declarants state that disclosure would hamper the United States' and its trade partners' free trade agreement, there is no showing that reduced negotiation flexibility would cause the 'requisite degree of harm' to the economic and security interests of the United States." The agency had argued that the rules of the free trade negotiations prohibited disclosure of confidential information. However, Roberts pointed out that "although USTR suggests that the operating rules of FTAA negotiations have a preclusive effect, it provides no specific information about the nature of these rules, including whether the United States' agreement to produce its proposals, but refusal to provide those of its negotiating partners, constitutes a breach of the rules." Roberts also decided the agency had failed to justify its claim that none of the information was segregable. He observed that "the record is insufficient as to this point because USTR does not explain which underlying facts in the documents are confidential in nature. Without a more detailed description of the contents of the documents, it is not possible to ascertain if, as stated by USTR, the documents consist of solely legal analysis and contain no factual material." Roberts rejected the Center's argument that the agency's exemption claim was waived because similar information had been disclosed on the internet. He indicated that "although the publicly disclosed draft contains proposals for each provision of the Agreement, the draft does not disclose the identity of the negotiating party proffering each proposal. CIEL has not met its burden of proving that the same information has already been released in the public domain."
Opinion/Order [47]Issues: Exemption 1 - De novo court review, Exemption 1 - Harm to national security, Exemption 5 - Privileges FOIA Project Annotation: Judge Richard Roberts has rejected a claim by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative that a document containing the negotiating position of the U.S. in trade talks of the Negotiating Group on Investment for the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas is protected by Exemption 1 (national security). USTR argued that release of the document, which contained the United States' initial proposed position on the meaning of the phrase "in like circumstances," particularly pertaining to issues like favored-nation trading status, would damage foreign relations by causing other nations to adopt more rigid trade positions, harm the U.S. in future trade litigation, and subject the U.S. to trade or investment retaliation. Because the negotiating nations had agreed to a policy of non-disclosure, releasing the document would undermine other counties' trust in the U.S. to negotiate in confidence. Roberts noted that "the prospect of revealing foreign government information typically supports withholding disclosure under Exemption 1," but went on to observe that "while disclosure here would breach the understanding with the other participating governments, the claim that such a breach would harm national security is much less compelling than it was in [prior cases] since the United States would be revealing its own position only, not that of any other country. USTR, therefore, has not shown it likely that disclosing [the] document would discourage foreign officials from providing information to the United States in the future because those officials would have no basis for concluding that the United States would dishonor its commitments to keep foreign information confidential." The agency also argued that disclosure of its position on the meaning of "in like circumstances" could be used as evidence that the U.S. had breached investment agreements and lead to litigation in which the ability of the U.S. to narrow or broaden the definition as needed could be impaired. Roberts pointed out that "this asserted need for flexibility in defining 'in like circumstances,' however, is inconsistent with USTR's stated goal of maintaining the trust of its negotiating partners." He explained that "inconsistent predictions of harm from disclosure should not provide the basis for withholding a document. Such inconsistency is an indication of unreliability, and the agency affidavits will be shown no deference with respect to any justification for withholding that involves maintaining the trust of negotiating partners." USTR contended disclosure would create the perception that the U.S. was trying to harden its bargaining tactics through public pressure. Roberts rejected this claim, noting that "this explanation does not provide a logical nexus between the document and the claimed national security exemption. USTR would not be releasing [the] document by way of a unilateral decision that a negotiating partner could perceived as a negotiating tactic. Rather, the USTR would be releasing [the] document to comply with the FOIA. . ."
Opinion/Order [56]Issues: Exemption 1 - Properly classified FOIA Project Annotation: In a case that has dragged on for more than ten years, Judge Richard Roberts has taken the unprecedented move of ordering the U.S. Trade Representative to disclose a document classified as confidential after finding the agency's arguments for continued classification made no sense and, thus, were not supported by the Executive Order on classification. Roberts noted that "having been afforded three opportunities to justify withholding the document, USTR has not provided a plausible or logical explanation for why disclosure of the document would harm the United States' foreign relations. Accordingly, USTR's motion for summary judgment will be denied, [the Center for International Environmental Law's] cross-motion will be granted, and USTR will be ordered to disclose Document 1." Although many people in and outside government believe too much information is classified, courts have been extraordinarily reluctant to "second-guess" an agency's procedurally proper decision to classify information. In response to the Supreme Court's conclusion in EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973), that once a document was properly classified courts had no authority to question that decision, Congress very specifically told courts to analyze classification decisions under the same de novo standard applicable to other exemption claims. But to head off a threatened veto of the 1974 FOIA amendments by President Gerald Ford, Congress added language in the legislative history indicating that agency classification determinations should be accorded deference by the courts. In an era of judicial interpretation that has been dominated by plain language analysis �" the judicial doctrine that if a statue is clear on its face there is no need to resort to legislative history�"plain language interpretation has been willfully ignored by courts and even the flimsiest claims in support of continued classification have been honored. So it comes as something akin to a shock to the system to see a judge actually weigh the importance of FOIA's disclosure policy against the claims that properly classified information needs to be protected. The document in question outlined the U.S. position on the legal meaning of "in like circumstances" as part of the negotiations for the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas. The 34 countries involved in the negotiations agreed at the beginning that they would not disclose documents received as part of the negotiating process unless the originating country agreed to disclosure. Throughout the litigation, USTR argued that this agreement was meant to facilitate negotiations and foster trust among the negotiating countries and that unilateral disclosure would harm the foreign relations of the U.S. by making it appear to be an untrustworthy negotiator. The negotiating countries ultimately agreed to allow public disclosure of documents on December 31, 2013. Part of the agency's problem was that Roberts continued to express skepticism of the claims USTR made to preserve the document's confidentiality. First, the agency argued that disclosure would undercut trust in the U.S. by other negotiating parties. But the agency also contended that disclosure would reveal its position and make it difficult to change or modify the U.S. stance. Roberts pointed out that "while the prospect of revealing foreign government information typically supports withholding disclosure under Exemption 1 (national security), the claim that a breach of the FTAA confidentiality agreement would harm national security is less compelling here since the United States would be revealing its own position only. USTR maintains that because the confidentiality agreement covered all of the material exchanged during negotiations, the loss of trust is the same. There is, however, a meaningful difference between the United States' disclosure of information that it receives in confidence from a foreign government, with the foreign government's understanding that the information will be kept secret, and the United States' disclosure of a document that it itself created and provided to others. While a breach of the confidentiality agreement will occur in either case, the resulting affect on the United States' foreign relations�"the key factor for assessing whether the document is properly classified�"is not identical." Roberts observed that "USTR's arguments regarding loss of trust are at a high level of generality, asserting that the confidentiality agreement facilitates the 'give-and-take of negotiations' without articulating particular reasons why its foreign negotiating partners would have any continued interest in maintaining the secrecy of the United States' own initial position on the phrase "in like circumstances.' The harm resulting from breach of the confidentiality agreement here, and the asserted need to insulate negotiations from potential opposition from participating nations' 'vested local economic interests' in order to provide 'room to negotiate' and make it less likely that foreign partners will 'adopt and maintain rigid negotiating positions unfavorable to U.S. economic and security interests' is substantially mitigated because the FTAA negotiations are [no longer] ongoing." He added that "the defendants' failure to assert any particular present sensitivities implicated by Document 1 leaves the breach of confidentiality agreement as the sole basis for inferring a loss of trust. A per se rule that existence of a confidentiality agreement provides an adequate basis for proper classification of a covered document is flatly incompatible with FOIA's commitment to subject government activity to 'the critical lens of public scrutiny.'" Further, he indicated that the agreement that documents could be disclosed in December 2013 was constrained by each country's ability to object to release of its own documents at that time. Roberts explained that this "supports CIEL's argument that the primary interest protected by confidentiality is a country's ability to determine the release of its own materials, not to keep others from releasing theirs." Turning to the agency's other argument that disclosure would harm its ability to revise positions, Roberts noted that "if, as defendants maintain, trade negotiators understand that an initial position like Document 1 is a non-binding starting point, and that, accordingly, the United States may revise or withdraw it at any time, it is unclear why disclosure of the document 'reasonably could be expected to cause damage' to the United States' foreign relations by reducing future flexibility. . .Defendants have presented no 'logical or plausible' reason, why future negotiating partners would have so firm an expectation that the current or future United States administration would or should adhere to the same interpretation of 'in like circumstances' prevented in the FTAA context such that the United States will be impeded in presenting a different interpretation."
Issues: Exemption 1 - Properly classified | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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