Case Detail
Case Title | LONG et al v. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT et al | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
District | District of Columbia | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
City | Washington, DC | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Case Number | 1:2014cv00109 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Date Filed | 2014-01-29 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Date Closed | Open | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Judge | Judge Amit P. Mehta | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Plaintiff | SUSAN B. LONG | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Plaintiff | DAVID BURNHAM | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Case Description | Susan Long and David Burnham, co-directors of the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, submitted requests to Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Customs and Border Protection for technical data related to databases maintained by ICE and CBP and for database records. For several of the requests, the agencies found responsive records, but withheld portions of them under Exemption 7(E) (investigative methods and techniques), as well as under Exemption 6 (invasion of privacy) and Exemption 7(C) (invasion of privacy concerning law enforcement records). For other requests, the agencies failed to respond. TRAC appealed the denials, but after hearing nothing further, TRAC filed suit. Complaint issues: Exemption 7(E) - Investigative methods or techniques, Adequacy - Search, Failure to respond within statutory time limit | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Defendant | IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Defendant | CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Documents | Docket Complaint Complaint attachment 1 Complaint attachment 2 Complaint attachment 3 Complaint attachment 4 Complaint attachment 5 Opinion/Order [29] FOIA Project Annotation: The public interest organization TRAC, housed at Syracuse University, has been dealt a severe blow in its attempts to access large quantities of agency data that it, in turn, uses to analyze government operations, by a ruling by Judge Amit Mehta finding that disclosure of several databases at the Department of Homeland Security would be too burdensome for the agency. The case explores agencies' obligations under FOIA to provide such massive amounts of data when to do so would cause serious disruptions in the agency's normal FOIA processes, either by requiring the agency to manipulate its databases in ways that it does not usually do or by presenting practically insurmountable problems in redacting data that is legitimately exempt. The case involved seven requests submitted by TRAC. Two requests asked for documentation related to several databases used by Immigration and Customs Enforcement�"the Enforcement Integrated Database, which includes information related to the investigation, arrest, booking, detention, and removal of individuals, and the Integrated Decision Support Database, a subset of the EID database that provides a continuously updated snapshot of certain EID data. In response to those two requests, ICE produced 97 pages and withheld the remaining responsive documents. The other five requests were for snapshots of data from the EID database. Two requests were sent to ICE. One request asked for information about actual snapshots of data extracted from the EID database, including how those snapshots were prepared and who was responsible for preparing the snapshots. The second request asked for a snapshot of the ENFORCE, which allows the agency to create, modify and access data stored in the EID database. TRAC next sent a request to Customs and Border Protection for a snapshot of EID data prepared for that agency. TRAC's final requests to ICE asked for a snapshot of the EID database prepared for the EARM Data Mart. The other request went to both ICE and CBP and asked for a snapshot of the EID data prepared for EID Data Mart. Both the EARM Datamart and the EID Datamart are subsets of data from the EID database pertaining to individuals involved in removal proceedings. In response to TRAC's request about how snapshots from the EID database were prepared, the agency disclosed nine pages redacted under Exemption 6 (invasion of privacy), Exemption 7(C) (invasion of privacy concerning law enforcement records) and Exemption 7(E) (investigative methods and techniques). The agency did not respond to the requests for actual snapshots of data. By the time the case got to court, the agency asserted information related to the databases was protected by Exemption 3 (other statutes), Exemption 7(A) (interference with ongoing investigation or proceeding) and Exemption 7(E). The agency also told Mehta that "the snapshots Plaintiff requested were not retained for the date ranges of the subject FOIA requests,. . .the requested information could not be produced with the technology currently in the Agency's possession and. . . even if the information could be produced, Defendants were not capable of redacting the information." The agency primarily relied on Exemption 7(E) for withholding the records about the structure of the database. TRAC argued the databases were not created for law enforcement purposes, a proposition Mehta quickly rejected. He noted that "plaintiffs concede that Defendants use the EID and IIDS databases for law enforcement purposes�"to assist ICE and CBP with deporting people unlawfully in the United States, to arrest those who violate federal immigration laws, and to track investigations and court proceedings of those apprehended. Thus, records concerning how these databases are constructed and how they operate�"like the data itself�"clearly have a rational 'nexus' to Defendants' law enforcement duties." He added that "these are not the kind of records compiled for generalized snooping of individuals' lives, but were prepared to effectuate the agencies' law enforcement responsibilities." Mehta then explained that the D.C. Circuit's decision in Blackwell v. FBI, 646 F.3d 37 (D.C. Cir. 2011), finding that methods of data collection could be protected under Exemption 7(E), meant that the DHS databases qualified for the exemption as well. He observed that "Blackwell [and similar district court rulings] teach that internal database codes, fields, and other types of identifiers used by law enforcement agencies to conduct, organize, and manage investigations and prosecutions qualify, at least, as law enforcement guidelines, if not also law enforcement methods and techniques." Mehta found TRAC offered its strongest argument as to why Exemption 7(E) did not apply when it came to the agency's claim that disclosure of database information could risk circumvention of law by allowing hackers to get into the databases. TRAC argued that "an unlawful cyber-attack cannot serve as a basis for withholding EID and IIDS metadata and database schema because such information, if disclosed, does not risk circumvention of the laws enforced by Defendants." But Mehta found that interpretation too narrow, noting that 'Congress did not qualify or modify 'the law' in any way to circumscribe the types of laws that might be violated in the event of disclosure for Exemption 7(E) to apply. Thus, a plain reading of the statute does not support Plaintiff's interpretation." However, Mehta was more convinced by TRAC's argument that a cyber-attack was not a credible threat because such an attack would require a publicly accessible interface with the EID or IIDS systems and such an outside interface did not exist. The agency pointed to an attack on Home Depot's database, but TRAC responded that attack was accomplished by gaining access through a point-of-sale machine, a scenario that did not exist here. Mehta indicated that the agency's burden for showing a risk of circumvention was quite low and observed that "judges are not cyber specialists and it would be the height of judicial irresponsibility for a court to blithely disregard such a claimed risk." Nevertheless, Mehta found the agency had not yet met the low bar for showing a risk of circumvention. He pointed out that "the court is left unconvinced, at this juncture, that the sole risk of circumvention of the law claimed by Defendants�"SQL injection attack�"would be increased if the requested metadata and database schema were disclosed." He ordered the agency to supplement the record on the issue. Alternatively, the agency claimed the database information was protected by the Federal Information Security Management Act. Unfortunately for the agency, Mehta observed that statute was repealed entirely on December 18, 2014 while the litigation was pending and was replaced by the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014, which, Mehta noted, did not qualify as an Exemption 3 statute because it did not cite to FOIA as required by the OPEN FOIA Act and because it did not alter agencies' FOIA obligations. Turning to TRAC's requests for snapshots, Mehta agreed with the agency that it did not have the technological ability to comply with the requests. Mehta observed that "Defendants have demonstrated that producing and redacting the requested snapshots would be unduly burdensome. The agency argued that the kind of snapshots requested by TRAC did not exist and that to create them would require programming that might run into the millions of dollars. Further, "even if Defendants could replicate the snapshot for production, they would face tremendous challenges in redacting sensitive personal and law enforcement material, which even Plaintiffs concede are subject to valid FOIA exemptions. The tables available in the EID consist of more than 6.7 billion rows of data, with the total amount of information contained within the EID exceeding five terabytes." TRAC submitted an affidavit from its own software engineer who indicated that commercial software provided significant ability to extract data and that the agency's cost estimate appeared overblown. But Mehta noted that "although [TRAC's declaration] raises some questions about whether the snapshots are indeed readily reproducible and redactable, the court ultimately finds those questions insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact that would preclude summary judgment in Defendants' favor. FOIA requires courts to 'accord substantial weight to an affidavit of an agency concerning the agency's determination as to technical feasibility. . .Plaintiff's declarant, though an expert in the field of database systems and management, has not offered any evidence that specifically rebuts [the agency's] assertions about the agencies' present technological capabilities as to the EID database and associated datamarts or regarding the burden that reproduction and redaction of the snapshots would impose on them. . .But once, as here, an agency has proffered a declaration as to the technical feasibility and reproducibility of a records request�"which, by statute, must be accorded substantial weight�"a plaintiff must offer more than generalities about technical capabilities of generic systems to overcome or raise questions about that declaration." TRAC's last argument was that disclosing the snapshots could not be that complex because ICE had provided similar snapshots to TRAC in response to previous requests. The agency argued that TRAC's current requests "are meaningfully different in scope and scale. Whereas Plaintiffs' previous, fulfilled requests sought specific information contained in the snapshots, the present requests seek the snapshots in their entirety." Mehta agreed, noting that "a request for a snapshot of the entire database is 'vastly different' from Plaintiffs' previous requests and, as a consequence, the manner in which ICE responded to the prior requests is 'wholly inadequate for responding to a request for all the data replicated at unspecified points in time into other datamarts.'. . .Plaintiffs have not offered any evidence specific to the databases at issue here that rebuts those contentions."
Opinion/Order [48]Issues: Choice of format - Burdensome, Exemption 3 - Provision must cite to FOIA, Exemption 7(E) - Investigative methods or techniques, Exemption 7(E) - Prosecutorial guidelines - Risk of circumvention FOIA Project Annotation: To settle a dispute between TRAC and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement as to whether disclosing metadata and database schema for its Enforcement Integration Database and its Integrated Decision Support Database, used to manage cases pertaining to the detention of undocumented immigrants, could lead to a risk of circumvention of the law as to qualify for protection under Exemption 7(E) (investigative methods and techniques), Judge Amit Mehta has set the case for trial. Since FOIA cases are almost always settled based on the parties' briefs, the need to hold an actual trial with witnesses is nearly unheard of. Making this case even rarer, the handful of cases that do go to trial almost always concern Exemption 4 (confidential business information), not Exemption 7(E). Nevertheless, sometimes a trial is the only way to ultimately settle a disputed issue. TRAC was forced to file suit after ICE decided to no longer disclose the data sometime after 2010, even though the agency had provided essentially the same data before that time. Previously, TRAC had regularly submitted FOIA requests covering current timeframes and the agency had released data that satisfied TRAC's requests. TRAC's lawsuit covered seven separate FOIA requests, only three of which were still in dispute. The agency withheld the metadata and database schema under Exemption 7(E), claiming that disclosure of the data from either database would risk a Structured Query Language (SQL) injection attack. TRAC argued that disclosure of the data could not result in an SQL injection attack because that type of attack requires a direct connection to a database and neither the EID nor the IIDS are publicly accessible. In his previous ruling, Mehta had agreed that the data qualified under the threshold requirement for Exemption 7 �" that the information was created or compiled for law enforcement purposes �" but found that the agency had not shown that disclosure could reasonably risk circumvention of the law and, in light of TRAC's contention that such an attack was not possible, ordered the agency to provide a more detailed explanation of its claim. This time, the agency argued that disclosure would risk circumvention of law "because disclosing that information would make it easier for hackers to create convincing e-mails that lull unsuspecting, authorized users to click on nefarious links or attachments, also known as phishing, or spear phishing attacks, and inadvertently allow hackers to access the system and/or steal users' credentials." Acknowledging that the D.C. Circuit's caselaw on Exemption 7(E) set a low bar for claiming the exemption, Mehta pointed out that "nonetheless, the Government cannot simply cite Exemption 7(E) and expect the court to rubber stamp its withholdings. At a minimum, the Government must show that its stated expectation of risk is reasonable." Rather than focus on the SQL injection attack that had been at the heart of its argument previously, the agency now focused on how a phishing attack might allow a hacker to gain entry. The agency told Mehta that "the information Plaintiffs requested would undermine its 'defense in depth' security strategy, in which it buries information about the system to prevent attackers from having the information that allows them to mount successful phishing and spear-phishing attacks. Additionally, release of this information would place other agencies' systems at risk, because once one system suffers a successful hack, any other connected system also can be breached." The agency also insisted that any prior disclosure of this information had been entirely "inadvertent." TRAC responded that "hackers do not need the metadata and database schema to launch an e-mail-based attack, but even if that information was disclosed, any risk of circumvention of law still depends on Defendant's system having some external access point, such as a web-based interface or internet connection, that would allow the hacker to remotely access or control the system �" which the Defendant's system does not have." TRAC also pointed out that the agency had provided the data on at least 100 occasions and was still disclosing it currently. TRAC concluded that "any expected risk of circumvention of law is not 'reasonable,' given the agency's consistent and fulsome release of this information for roughly the last ten years, including throughout the length of this litigation." Faced with these contrary positions, Mehta observed that "summary judgment is inappropriate because Defendant's affidavits do not state in any level of detail how a hacker could access a system with no external access point, and Plaintiffs have introduced specific facts that contradict Defendant's statements that all prior releases of this information were inadvertent. These uncertainties on the record create a triable issue of fact as to the reasonableness of Defendant's expectation of risk of circumvention of the law." Mehta was puzzled as to whether or not such an attack could possibly be successful if there was no way for hackers to gain external access. He pointed out that "these questions are material because Defendant's argument centers on the fact that a circumvention of law only occurs when the hacker accesses the database. If there is no means of accessing the database, then Defendant's expectation that disclosure of the EID and IIDS metadata and database schema will risk circumvention of the law is not reasonable. Although Defendant continuously repeats that access to the EID is possible even in the absence of an external access point, Defendant has offered no explanation for how that would occur. At most, Defendant indicates that disclosure of the withheld materials would allow a hacker to study the database. But what then? The court could infer from Defendant's submissions that the EID is connected to another government database that has an external access point and that interconnection makes the EID vulnerable, but that is impermissible speculation on the court's part. Defendant has not identified any database that is connected to the EID, has an external access point, and is vulnerable to attack." Mehta was also concerned about the agency's insistence that any disclosures were inadvertent, while TRAC provided evidence that the same data had been disclosed for the past ten years. He noted that "Plaintiff's representations that Defendant not only has disclosed large amounts of functionally indistinguishable information to that being currently withheld, but also has done so for nearly ten years �" with the most recent disclosure occurring in February 2017 �" directly contravenes Defendant's statement that the disclosures of the EID and IIDS metadata and database schema was entirely 'inadvertent' and the agency has acted to prevent such disclosures since June 2013." He observed that "these disputed facts are material because if Defendant has been knowingly and intentionally disclosing EID and IIDS metadata and database schema for year, including during the present litigation, then that would call into question the reasonableness of Defendant's expectation that disclosure of the presently withheld information could contribute to or increase the risk of phishing, spear phishing, APT attacks, or SQL attacks." He pointed out that if that were the case, then "it arguably would be patently unreasonable to claim an expected risk of attack from disclosing the presently withheld materials."
Opinion/Order [64]Issues: Exemption 7(E) - Prosecutorial guidelines - Risk of circumvention FOIA Project Annotation: After holding a rare two-day trial, Judge Amit Mehta has ruled that U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement has finally shown that Exemption 7(E) (investigative methods and techniques) applies to some data elements in its databases pertaining to the detention of undocumented immigrants. Susan Long and David Burnham, co-directors of the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, submitted requests for aggregate data from the Enforcement Integrated Database (EID) and the Integrated Decision Support Database (IIDS). Although the agency had provided the aggregate data TRAC requested with all the requested data elements in the past, ICE eventually took the position that disclosure would allow someone to hack its systems and harm its ability to protect the data. However, in several prior opinions, Mehta had found that ICE had not justified the low bar required under Exemption 7(E) and finally ordered a trial with witnesses. Acknowledging the low bar for invoking Exemption 7(E), Mehta observed that "even when an exemption broadly applies, however, an agency nevertheless must 'tailor' its withholdings to only that which the exemption protects." For the first time at the evidentiary hearing, ICE confirmed that it was possible to access the two databases remotely. With this knowledge, Mehta explained ICE's asserted risk as being tied to "the additional damage a hacker might cause once he gains unauthorized access to the EID and IIDS if it has advance knowledge of the metadata and database schemas â€" not the danger that he will gain access in the first place by successfully managing to subvert the [trusted internet connection] and traverse any security measures intended to protect those databases. In this case, that additional harm might consist of viewing, modifying, or deleting sensitive law enforcement information related to ICE's enforcement duties, and possibly even erasing any evidence that the databases were attacked or otherwise compromised." TRAC argued that the agency's current security measures were adequate to protect the databases and even if a would-be hacker gained access to the databases, advance knowledge of the metadata and database schema would not aid the attacker in doing any damage. Mehta rejected both arguments. He noted that "while the evidence adduced at the evidentiary hearing demonstrates that there are security countermeasures in place to prevent a hacker from gaining access to the system, nowhere was it credibly suggested that access is impossible." As to whether advance knowledge of the database schema would aid a hacker, Mehta pointed out that the agency's witness "credibly testified that advance knowledge of this information would assist a hacker in launching a more targeted and effective attack that is less likely to be detected by the agency. Plaintiffs' own expert acknowledged that advance knowledge of the metadata and database schema could make some difference in an attack by enabling an attacker to recreated the database to practice his attack This advance knowledge, [TRAC's expert witness] conceded, could reduce the number of queries necessary for a hacker to accomplish his attack, thereby making the attack more efficient." Finding ICE's testimony persuasive, Mehta observed that "the court finds that there is a material risk that comprehensive knowledge of the organization of the databases could enable a bad actor to execute an attack undetected. FOIA Exemption 7(E) does not countenance such risk." However, Mehta agreed with TRAC that ICE had not considered whether non-exempt data could be segregated and disclosed. He pointed out that "the court is satisfied that the database schema (which, by definition, describes the structure of ICE's databases) presents a material risk [if disclosed]. But the other categories of information requested by Plaintiffs â€" field and table names, codes, code translations, and code lookup tables â€" do not appear to uniformly pose such a risk." TRAC had a third FOIA request still in dispute because ICE had not provided sufficient information as why disputed data elements should be withheld. Mehta told ICE to provide further justification to resolve the remaining issues pertaining to that FOIA request.
Issues: Exemption 7(E) | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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