Case Detail
Case Title | PEOPLE FOR THE ETHICAL TREATMENT OF ANIMALS v. NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
District | District of Columbia | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
City | Washington, DC | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Case Number | 1:2010cv01818 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Date Filed | 2010-10-27 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Date Closed | 2014-10-08 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Judge | Judge Amy Berman Jackson | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Plaintiff | PEOPLE FOR THE ETHICAL TREATMENT OF ANIMALS | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Defendant | NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES also known as NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Appeal | D.C. Circuit 12-5183 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Documents | Docket Complaint Complaint attachment 1 Opinion/Order [27] FOIA Project Annotation: Judge Amy Berman Jackson has ruled that the NIH properly invoked a Glomar response to a request from People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals concerning an investigation of three researchers at Auburn University for mistreatment of lab animals. In response to PETA's request for records concerning the investigation and the existence of an agency-required confidentiality agreement concerning the investigation, NIH claimed it could neither confirm nor deny the existence of records because to do so would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy under Exemption 7(C) (invasion of privacy concerning law enforcement records). PETA argued that the researchers did not have a privacy interest because the alleged investigation concerned their professional, not personal, conduct. Jackson noted that "plaintiff mischaracterizes the nature of the privacy interest that has been asserted in this case. This Circuit has recognized that a member of the public has a privacy interest in information that might suggest that the individual was the target of a law enforcement investigation. [The Circuit case law does not] make a distinction between whether the alleged investigation concerns an individual's personal or professional conduct�"what matters is that there is a privacy interest in a person's identity being associated with the investigation. If the Court were to accept plaintiff's theory that a person never has a personal privacy interest in investigations into their professional conduct, it would mean that no target of a white collar criminal grand jury investigation would have a privacy interest in that fact, which cannot be true." PETA contended that the existence of the investigation was already publicly known. But Jackson pointed out that "plaintiff has failed to point to anything indicating that the government, as opposed to some other organization or source, has acknowledged the existence of the investigation." PETA provided an interoffice memo from the Agriculture Department indicating that PETA's complaints against the Auburn researchers were partially valid. Jackson observed that "it cannot be said that a non-authenticated interoffice memo is tantamount to public acknowledgement of the existence of an investigation relating to the three named individuals." PETA argued that there was a public interest in knowing whether researchers using federal funding were treating lab animals humanely. Finding that this was not a valid public interest under Reporters Committee, Jackson responded that "here, the release of the information plaintiff has requested would reveal nothing about the government's own conduct, as opposed to the conduct of individual researchers or recipients of government funding." The agency had asserted that PETA failed to exhaust administrative remedies because it filed its administrative appeal after the time for doing so had expired. But Jackson rejected the claim, noting that "PETA did not attempt to bypass the administrative review process; instead, it reiterated its requests in a document sent to NIH six months later. NIH then processed that complaint and responded to those requests. As a result, this Court will review PETA's [request] because there are not prudential considerations that would militate in favor of dismissal."
Opinion/Order [46]Issues: Exemption 7(C) - Invasion of privacy concerning law enforcement records, Determination - Glomar response FOIA Project Annotation: Judge Amy Berman Jackson has ruled that PETA is entitled to attorney's fees for its litigation against NIH concerning records about the investigation of animal researchers at Auburn University, but because the relief the organization was granted on appeal to the D.C. Circuit was so narrow that only ten percent of its fee request should be granted. PETA had submitted complaints to both NIH and the Department of Agriculture based on its own undercover investigation of research using animals at Auburn University. PETA then made several FOIA requests to NIH for records concerning any investigations the agency took against two researchers at Auburn University whose research was funded by NIH as well as a colleague. PETA learned as a result of a request made under the Alabama Open Records Act concerning the three Auburn researchers that Auburn has signed a confidentiality agreement with NIH that prohibited the university from disclosing information. PETA made two further requests to NIH for records concerning the researchers and the confidentiality agreement. NIH invoked a Glomar response neither confirming nor denying the existence of records. Jackson upheld the agency's Glomar response and PETA appealed to the D.C. Circuit. The D.C. Circuit upheld the Glomar response to the extent that it pertained to the three researchers, but indicated that because PETA's request could be read to request records on investigations the agency undertook of Auburn University, the Glomar response did not cover such records and the agency was obligated to search for them. The agency subsequently conducted a search and concluded that it had never received PETA's complaint letter and had never conducted an investigation of Auburn or the researchers. PETA then filed a motion for $227,000 in attorney's fees, arguing that the D.C. Circuit's ruling that the Glomar response was overbroad entitled them to fees. NIH argued that PETA was not the prevailing party because the relief it was granted was not substantial enough. But Jackson noted that "while the Court agrees that the sum total of plaintiff's victory in this case was small, the test is not merely the size of the relief obtained but whether plaintiff obtained some judicial relief on the merits that resulted in a 'change in the legal relationship' between the parties. Indeed, the degree of plaintiff's success is relevant to the size of reasonable fees, not to its eligibility for a fee award." Jackson found that the fact that the agency did not have any responsive records was not dispositive either. She pointed out that "if the agency had responsive documents that fell within the broader request, it would have been required to release them to PETA. The fact that it did not have responsive documents does not negate the fact that the D.C. Circuit's ruling 'changed the legal relationship' between PETA and NIH." Jackson indicated that the public interest factor did not weigh in favor of either party. She noted that "no documents were produced and the litigation did not in fact generate any information about how NIH responds to animal welfare complaints or the way it processes FOIA requests. Since nothing was produced and no information was gleaned, there was nothing 'to add to the fund of information that citizens many use in making vital political choices.'" By contrast, however, Jackson observed that the information requested was potentially valuable to the public interest. She pointed out that "if on remand defendant had produced 'documents showing that, in response to complaints filed against the named researchers, the agency conducted an investigation other than one targeting the researchers,' then the litigation could potentially have shed light on both of those practices." She then found that NIH's position was reasonable. She noted that "the D.C. Circuit found the Court's reading of the request to be 'understandable,' and it held that the Glomar response 'would be fully warranted' if PETA's request was interpreted to be confined to records revealing the existence of an investigation of the three researchers." Jackson concluded that PETA was entitled to ten percent of its fee request. She observed that "it prevailed only to the extent the request could be broadly read to seek other documents. And even with respect to that category of documents, it turned out there were no responsive documents. Given the narrow slice of relief that PETA obtained, the Court finds that a reasonable fee award is ten percent of PETA's claimed amount, or $22,724."
Issues: Litigation - Attorney's fees - Prevailing party, Litigation - Attorney's fees - Entitlement - Reasonable Basis for Withholding | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
User-contributed Documents | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Docket Events (Hide) | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|