Case Detail
Case Title | ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER v. UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
District | District of Columbia | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
City | Washington, DC | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Case Number | 1:2011cv00290 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Date Filed | 2011-02-02 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Date Closed | 2013-03-07 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Judge | Chief Judge Royce C. Lamberth | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Plaintiff | ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Defendant | UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Appeal | D.C. Circuit 13-5114 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Appeal | D.C. Circuit 13-5367 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Documents | Docket Complaint Complaint attachment 1 Opinion/Order [23] FOIA Project Annotation: In two cases concerning Homeland Security records on the use of Advanced Image Technology scanners as the primary method for scanning passengers, Judge Royce Lamberth, while upholding most of the agency's claims, has ruled that the agency improperly tried to withhold certain records from EPIC under Exemption 4 (confidential business information) and Exemption 5 (deliberative process privilege). The agency argued that its own test results of a body scanning machine were protected under Exemption 4 because the "ultimate source" of the information was the company's machine. Rejecting the agency's claim, Lamberth noted that "even assuming that information gathered from an on-site visit to a plant qualifies as 'obtained from a person', information gathered from the test of equipment already in the government's possession does not. The information was generated by the government's own testing, not by a private party, and therefore is not entitled to exemption 4 protection." Lamberth also found that a subsequent report that relied on the government's earlier test results was also not protected under Exemption 4. He indicated that "information based on that earlier report would also not be 'obtained from a person.'" He added that "the government bears the burden to justify withholding any records. [Its] descriptions [of the records] fail to demonstrate that any particular piece of the withheld information was not based on the [earlier] report, so the Court finds that these withholdings were invalid under exemption 4." EPIC argued that some records were not covered by the deliberative process privilege because they were purely factual. But Lamberth pointed out that "all of these materials, factual or not, were properly withheld under exemption 5 because they are all part of DHS's deliberative process regarding the future of the AIT program." In the other opinion, Lamberth affirmed this holding, noting that "it follows that whether or not some of the material withheld was 'purely factual' is of no moment because this factual material was critical to the agency's deliberative process in determining whether to implement [its Automated Target Recognition program]." Rejecting the claim that some drafts were not deliberative because they were not part of a final decision, Lamberth explained that "to protect a 'draft' document, an agency need not necessarily identify a corresponding final document but must provide adequate description of the document to demonstrate that it was genuinely part of the agency's deliberative process." Lamberth found a PowerPoint presentation prepared for Congress was not protected by Exemption 5. He noted that "the document was assembled and presented to assist the Appropriations Committee in its own funding determinations." He rejected the agency's argument that PowerPoint presentation consisted of "preliminary agency opinions" and observed that "[this] argument does not undermine the main conclusion: this document was prepared to assist with Congressional deliberations rather than agency deliberations." The agency also withheld records under Exemption 3 (other statutes) because it concluded they constituted sensitive security information. After finding that 49 U.S.C. § 114(r) qualified as an Exemption 3 statute, Lamberth indicated that "judicial review of [the agency's] determination that certain material is nondisclosable sensitive security information is available exclusively in federal circuit courts." He added that "because the Court lacks jurisdiction to review the merits of the specific withholdings made pursuant to that provision, the legal conclusion that § 114(r) qualifies for exemption 3 withholding takes this Court as far as it can go here."
Opinion/Order [40]Issues: Exemption 4 - Confidential business information, Exemption 5 - Privileges - Deliberative process privilege - Deliberative FOIA Project Annotation: In two companion decisions, Judge Royce Lamberth has ruled that EPIC is eligible for attorney's fees for litigation against the Department of Homeland Security and the Transportation Security Administration for records concerning whole body imaging technology, but that because it only succeeded on part of its challenge the award should be reduced accordingly. As a result, Lamberth found EPIC had succeeded on only one-seventh of its claims against DHS and 40 percent of its claims against TSA. Because EPIC's legal team included several attorneys who had not yet been admitted to the D.C. Bar, Lamberth indicated they could only be compensated at the level of paralegals. As to attorneys who were bar members of another state and not admitted to the D.C. Bar, Lamberth explained that "this Court declines to monetarily penalize a FOIA plaintiff just because a licensed attorney who had not yet acquired a D.C. license signed a brief, even if that is not in accordance with local rules. Instead, the Court will apply the junior attorney rates that EPIC seeks." Lamberth scolded EPIC for requesting fees for overlapping work in both cases. He pointed out that "if a plaintiff were to get fees from two different adversaries for the same hours, there would be a windfall of 100% beyond compensation for the attorney's efforts." Turning to EPIC's entitlement to fees, Lamberth noted that "while the parties dispute the public benefit garnered from the 18 pages of production caused by the summary judgment motion, this Court is satisfied that EPIC sought the documents for public purposes. . ." But Lamberth then observed that "even though EPIC is entitled to fees, the Court will reduce those fees by six-sevenths because of EPIC's limited success. DHS withheld documents based on three exemptions [Exemption 4 (confidential business information), Exemption 5 (deliberative process privilege), and Exemption 6 (invasion of privacy], and EPIC won on its motion to compel disclosure with respect to only one of those exemptions [Exemption 4], leading to only 18 pages of new documents. . .[T]he Court finds that on the merits, EPIC dedicated 6 pages out of 42 of argument, or one-seventh, to the winning issue. Therefore, EPIC will receive one-seventh of fees on the merits." After rejecting some billing hours, including a 50 percent reduction for double billing, Lamberth reduced EPIC's fee request from $22,242 to $3,028.86. In the TSA litigation, although EPIC only received portions of ten pages, Lamberth found their overall success rate was higher, explaining that "this Court finds that EPIC dedicated about 13 pages of argument our of 33, or [40] percent to Exemption 5 (the winning issue)." As a result, Lamberth awarded EPIC $9,373 in attorney's fees.
Issues: Litigation - Attorney's fees - Entitlement - Calculation of award | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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