Case Detail
Case Title | CENTER FOR EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE et al | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
District | District of Columbia | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
City | Washington, DC | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Case Number | 1:2013cv00414 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Date Filed | 2013-04-01 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Date Closed | 2013-12-26 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Judge | Judge Ellen S. Huvelle | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Plaintiff | CENTER FOR EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Defendant | UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Defendant | U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Documents | Docket Complaint Complaint attachment 1 Complaint attachment 2 Complaint attachment 3 Complaint attachment 4 Complaint attachment 5 Opinion/Order [23] FOIA Project Annotation: Ruling on an issue of first impression, Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle has found that the Presidential Policy Directive on Global Development, communicating policy on national security and foreign relations, is not protected by the presidential communications privilege and must be disclosed by the State Department in response to a request from the Center for Effective Government. Huvelle pointed out that the directive, known as PPD-6, "is a widely-publicized, non-classified Presidential Policy Directive on issues of foreign aid and development that has been distributed broadly within the Executive Branch and used by recipient agencies to guide decision-making. Even though issued as a directive, the PPD-6 carries the force of law as policy guidance to be implemented by recipient agencies, and it is the functional equivalent of an Executive Order." The State Department claimed the entire directive was protected by Exemption 5 (privileges), specifically the presidential communications privilege. Relying on the handful of cases analyzing the presidential communications privilege, particularly In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1997), Huvelle noted that "the scope of the privilege is to be 'construed as narrowly as is consistent with ensuring that the confidentiality of the President's decision-making process is adequately protected.' As such, it 'only applies to communications that. . .advisers and their staff author or solicit and receive in the course of performing their function of advising the President on official government matters' and does not generally 'extend to staff outside the White House in executive branch agencies.'" The government admitted the directive had been widely disseminated within the executive branch, but took the position that the privilege applied "because, regardless of how widely the document has been distributed within the Executive Branch, it originated with the President, and. . .the privilege protects the President's final decisions." However, Huvelle pointed out that "the D.C. Circuit has never actually applied the presidential communications privilege to a 'final' presidential directive or decision. Instead, the privilege's application to 'final' decisions, as in any other circumstance, is no broader than necessary to ensure that the confidentiality of the presidential decision-making process, and its concomitant decision-making benefits, are 'adequately protected.'" She observed that "when a court decides whether the privilege extends to a document or class of documents, it must ask whether application of the privilege is necessary to protect the confidentiality of communications as between the President and his advisers." Huvelle pointed out that "in ruling in dictum that the privilege can apply to 'final' documents, the [D.C. Circuit in In re Sealed Case] rested on the fact that the privilege also protects the President's ability to 'operate effectively.' However, this broad purpose is not implicated in this case." Indeed, Huvelle explained, this case did not involve a quintessential and nondelegable Presidential power. Nor was the PPD-6 "relevatory of the President's deliberations" since "the PPD-6 was distributed far beyond the President's close advisors and its substance was widely discussed by the President in the media." She observed that In re Sealed Case did not support the conclusion that "the D.C. Circuit specifically considered, no less endorsed, the extension of the presidential communications privilege to presidential communications distributed and implemented widely throughout the Executive Branch." Moreover, Huvelle indicated that "there is no evidence that the PPD-6 was intended to be, or has been treated as, a confidential presidential communication." Aside from the fact the directive was not classified, Huvelle pointed out that "the fact sheet released for PPD-6 described in detail the goals and initiatives set forth therein, copying verbatim many portions of the PPD-6. . .Although the government is correct that the disclosure of portions of a document subject to the presidential communications privilege does not waive the privilege as to the entire document, the widely publicized nature of the PPD-6 is important in considering the confidentiality interests implicated by the directive's disclosure under FOIA." While Huvelle agreed with the government that limiting PPD-6's distribution to those with a need-to-know implicated confidentiality concerns, Huvelle criticized the government for failing to define the scope of need-to-know in this case. She pointed out that "as in the attorney-client privilege context, the scope of the 'need to know' is relevant to the presidential communications privilege, where, for the privilege to apply, the reason a given recipient 'needs to know' must implicate the purposes that animate the privilege: the promotion of candor and effective presidential decision-making." She explained that "just like agency advisory documents that never reach the Office of the President, documents distributed from the Office of the President for non-advisory purposes do not implicate the goals of candor, opinion-gathering, and effective decision-making that confidentiality under the privilege is meant to protect." She added that "simply put, the purposes of the privilege are not furthered by protecting from public disclosure presidential directives distributed beyond the President's closest advisors for non-advisory purposes." Even worse for the government's position, Huvelle pointed out that there was substantial evidence that the directive had been disseminated for non-advisory purposes. She indicated that the government's response to this evidence was to insist that "the only relevant question is 'whether the document at issue originated with (or at the request of) the President or one of his close advisors' and if the answer is yes, the fact that the 'original recipients of the document subsequently distributed it beyond the President's inner circle' is irrelevant." Huvelle flatly rejected that assertion. Instead, she pointed out that "no court has suggested that the mere fact that a President's direct involvement in a communication, either as an author or recipient, renders it automatically protected. Instead, the privilege has always been limited to certain types of communications directly involving the President. . ." Huvelle was disturbed by what she called the "unbounded nature of the government's position." She indicated that "the purpose underlying the distribution of a presidential communication beyond the President's closest advisers is paramount. If distribution is limited to advisory purposes, the privilege may apply; if distribution is far broader, the purposes animating the privilege will not justify its application." Huvelle concluded that if she accepted the government's position, "there would be no effective limitation on a President's ability to engage in 'secret law' and, at least for presidential directives, FOIA would become 'more. . .a withholding statute than a disclosure statute.'"
Issues: Exemption 5 - Privileges, Public domain | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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