Case Detail
Case Title | ROSENBERG v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT et al | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
District | District of Columbia | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
City | Washington, DC | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Case Number | 1:2012cv00452 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Date Filed | 2012-03-23 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Date Closed | 2014-02-03 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Judge | Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Plaintiff | LAWRENCE ROSENBERG | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Defendant | UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Defendant | UNITED STATES MARSHALS SERVICE | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Defendant | EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR UNITED STATES ATTORNEY | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Defendant | FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Documents | Docket Complaint Complaint attachment 1 Opinion/Order [65] FOIA Project Annotation: In a companion decision, Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly has ruled that Lawrence Rosenberg failed to exhaust his administrative remedies when he filed suit four days after receiving ICE's acknowledgement of his administrative appeal. Rosenberg had requested documents concerning the raid on Agriprocessors' meatpacking plant and the subsequent prosecution of Sholom Rubashkin in September 2011. The agency determined that part of Rosenberg's request was duplicative of a 2009 request filed by Rubashkin's previous counsel. The agency located 166 pages and three spreadsheets responsive to the 2009 request, withholding parts of 155 pages and the three spreadsheets in February 2012. Rosenberg filed an administrative appeal March 16, 2012, which ICE acknowledged on March 22, indicating that because of the large volume of appeals, "there may be some delay in resolving this matter." Rosenberg called the ICE FOIA office on March 23 inquiring as to how long it would take to receive a response to his appeal. After the FOIA office indicated his appeal had just been received, Rosenberg, according to ICE, threatened to sue over the agency's slow response and hung up. He then filed suit the same day. Rosenberg argued that he had exhausted his administrative remedies because ICE's acknowledgement letter constituted a denial of his request to expedite his appeal. He also argued that pursuing the appeal would be futile and that Rubashkin would be irreparably harmed if exhaustion was required. Kollar-Kotelly noted that "the only thing the letter purported to do was to acknowledge receipt of the Plaintiff's appeal and indicate there may be some delay in processing the appeal. The letter did not purport to address any of the substantive issues raised in the Plaintiff's appeal." Rosenberg argued the letter constituted the agency's determination that it would be unable to meet the statutory time limit. But Kollar-Kotelly pointed out that "this argument assumes that which the Plaintiff seeks to prove: that the March 22 letter was a determination by the agency. The fact that 'ICE's letter spoke to Plaintiff's time concerns, even though it made clear that it would not act in an urgent or expedited manner' at best means the letter constituted the consummation of the agency's decisionmaking process as to the timing of the Plaintiff's appeal. The letter did not purport to convey any agency position regarding the merits of the Plaintiff's appeal, much less the agency's final decision." She observed that "assuming arguendo ICE's March 22, 2012, letter amounted to a denial of a request for expedited consideration of the Plaintiff's appeal, at best the Plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies as to the request for expedited treatment of his appeal." She added that "even if a party exhausts his administrative remedies as to a particular aspect of his claim, the court's review is limited to those objections and arguments that were subject to full administrative review." She indicated that "Plaintiff filed suit just three days after ICE received his appeal and before the agency had the opportunity to consider any of the Plaintiff's substantive arguments regarding the scope of the agency's search, applicability of certain withholdings, and need for a Vaughn index. The Plaintiff filed suit before the agency issued a final determination on the merits of his appeal, and weeks before the agency was required by statute to issue a final determination, thus denying the agency the opportunity to review its initial determination, correct any errors, or create an adequate record." Dismissing Rosenberg's futility argument, Kollar-Kotelly pointed out that "the fact that the agency has elected to await the Court's disposition of the present motions before drafting a Vaughn index or otherwise reconsidering its response to the Plaintiff's request does not show futility." Further, "the agency has indicated that it is willing to produce a Vaughn index and reconsider certain issues if additional information is provided by the Plaintiff." She also noted Rosenberg was in part responsible for the delay. She observed that "in lamenting the amount of time that has elapsed since the Plaintiff submitted his request to ICE, the Plaintiff omits the fact that rather than file suit after ICE failed to initially comply with the statutory deadlines, he waited over five months for the agency to respond." She concluded that "the agency's interest in having the opportunity to correct its own errors and create an adequate record for review outweigh the Plaintiff's interest in immediate judicial review, particularly in light of the Plaintiff's extensive delay in pursuing his own claims."
Opinion/Order [67]Issues: Litigation - Jurisdiction - Failure to Exhaust FOIA Project Annotation: Judge Collen Kollar-Kotelly has ruled that Lawrence Rosenberg failed to exhaust his administrative remedies when he did not appeal EOUSA's decision to require a substantial prepayment of fees before processing his request concerning a 2008 raid on the Agriprocessors meatpacking plant in Iowa and the subsequent prosecution of Sholom Rubashkin, and its refusal to search for records on third parties without further clarification. Kollar-Kotelly also dismissed Rosenberg's claim against the Marshals Service since he failed to file an administrative appeal. EOUSA divided Rosenberg's multi-part request into two parts, one concerning the prosecution of Rubashkin by the U.S. Attorney's Office in the Northern District of Iowa, and the other for information concerning third parties. It told Rosenberg that it would not process the request for third party information without waivers for the individuals. Rosenberg did not appeal the denial, but filed suit against several agencies in March 2012. In June 2012, EOUSA informed Rosenberg that the Northern District of Iowa office had estimated that at least 33 backup tapes would have to be restored at a cost of $37,684, and that further required hosting and processing would cost another $120,000. The EOUSA letter indicated that his request would not be considered received until the agency either heard back from him within 30 days or he appealed the decision to OIP. Rosenberg did not contact EOUSA or appeal its decision. The Marshals Service located 166 pages, referred 98 pages to EOUSA or ICE, and on Nov. 2, 2011, disclosed 58 pages in full or part. Rosenberg did not appeal the Marshal Services' response. Rosenberg argued that §552(a)(6)(B)(iii)(I), which prohibits agencies from charging fees if they miss any time limit, barred EOUSA from assessing fees. But Kollar-Kotelly indicated that the prohibition did not apply if unusual or exceptional circumstances existed. She observed that "because unusual circumstances apply to the Plaintiff's request, the EOUSA is entitled to impose search fees on Plaintiff despite failing to comply with the timing requirements of paragraph (6)." Rosenberg contended that since the agency had failed to notify him that unusual circumstances existed, as required by §552(a)(6)(B)(i)-(ii), it could not claim unusual circumstances. But Kollar-Kotelly explained that "the plain text of 552(a)(4)(A)(viii) requires only that unusual circumstances as defined by paragraph (6)(B) or (C) exist, not that unusual circumstances exist and that the agency properly seek additional time to respond to the request in light of unusual circumstances." Rosenberg then claimed that the agency was precluded from assessing fees because it had failed to request them before litigation or during the administrative process. Kollar-Kotelly noted that "the fact that a fee request was made after the Plaintiff commenced litigation does not excuse the Plaintiff from paying the requested fees." In response, Rosenberg asserted that earlier case law had been superseded by the 2007 provision prohibiting an agency from charging fees if it missed the time limit. Kollar-Kotelly disagreed, pointing out that "the 2007 amendments limited the situations in which an agency can impose fees, but has no effect on the principle set forth in [earlier case law] that when a fee request is valid, a plaintiff must comply, even if the agency did not submit the fee request until after the plaintiff filed suit." As to Rosenberg's contention that the agency had failed to argue the fees issue at the administrative level, Kollar-Kotelly observed that "the EOUSA cannot be faulted for failing to raise arguments during administrative proceedings when the Plaintiff elected to bypass administrative proceedings altogether." Rosenberg also claimed the fee estimate was unreasonable. But Kollar-Kotelly pointed out that "the fees are based on estimates of the hours that would be required for each step in the process of restoring the back-up tapes that may contain responsive documents. The fees are in accordance with Department of Justice regulations, and the EOUSA provided the Plaintiff the opportunity to reformulate his request or specify that he would only pay up to a certain amount." Turning to EOUSA's denial of his request for third-party personal information, Rosenberg's primary argument was that EOUSA had failed to take into account that many of the 101 individuals named in his request were public officials whose privacy interests were diminished. Kollar-Kotelly indicated that "the Plaintiff [does not] suggest he could not identify which of the individuals he included in his own FOIA request were 'public officials' not subject to Privacy Act withholdings. The fact that the Plaintiff would have liked an explicit list of the paragraphs [in his request] the EOUSA included within the scope of [the third-party information request] before drafting his appeal does not excuse his failure to exhaust his administrative remedies." As to the Marshals Service request, Rosenberg contended that he thought the agency's response letter indicated that it was still working on the request rather than constituting a final response. Saying that "there is no evidence to suggest the Marshals Service ever indicated to the Plaintiff that a search for potentially responsive documents was ongoing," Kollar-Kotelly rejected Rosenberg's claim that records produced during the litigation indicated that the Marshals Service was still in the process of responding to his request. However, Kollar-Kotelly observed that "to the contrary [the agency's] unrefuted declaration indicates that the agency re-reviewed records during the course of this litigation. Though the June 2012 production [of records] is arguably relevant to the adequacy of the agency's initial search, it does not call into question the finality of the agency's [response] letter."
Opinion/Order [70]Issues: Litigation - Jurisdiction - Failure to Exhaust, Time Limits - Exceptional circumstances FOIA Project Annotation: Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly has ruled that the FBI properly withheld information concerning its role in the investigation and prosecution of Sholom Rubashkin for using illegal immigrants at his meat-packing plant, Agriprocessors, in Iowa under Exemption 7(C) (invasion of privacy concerning law enforcement records), Exemption 7(D) (confidential sources), and Exemption 7(E) (investigatory methods and techniques). Although she faulted the agency's search, she also rejected Lawrence Rosenberg's claim that the agency had not promptly responded to his request. In her third ruling on Rosenberg's multi-agency FOIA suit, Kollar-Kotelly noted initially that the FBI had located 1,223 potentially responsive pages and had asked Rosenberg in October 2011to commit to pay duplication fees of $112.30 for paper records or $20 for the cost of a CD. Rosenberg did not respond to the agency's letter and the agency closed his request. Rosenberg instead filed suit against several agencies, including the FBI, in March 2012. In response to the litigation, the agency disclosed 39 pages in full and 322 pages in part. It withheld 155 pages pursuant to exemptions and the remaining 450 pages that had been sealed by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Iowa. Rosenberg first claimed that he was not required to respond to the FBI's fee commitment letter because the agency's regulations presumed a requester was liable for $25 by merely making a request. But Kollar-Kotelly pointed out that "because the Plaintiff failed to respond to the FBI's letter, the FBI had no way of knowing whether the Plaintiff would elect to receive responsive documents on disk, thus incurring no more than $25 in duplication fees, or whether the Plaintiff would elect to receive the documents in hard copy, thus incurring up to $112.30 in duplication fees. [The section of the regulations committing to pay $25] did not come into play unless and until the Plaintiff indicated in which format responsive documents should be produced." Dismissing Rosenberg's claim that the agency had not responded promptly, Kollar-Kotelly noted that "this argument ignores the fact that the FBI's statutory obligation to respond 'promptly' terminated in November 2011 when the Plaintiff failed to response to the agency's October 19, 2011, letter. The Plaintiff offers no authority for the proposition that the FBI's decision to produce documents in response to this litigation triggered any statutory duty to produce documents within a particular time frame." Rosenberg challenged the search by arguing that the agency had narrowed its search terms inappropriately and that it had never explained why it only searched its Central Records System database. Kollar-Kotelly agreed that the agency's explanation was inadequate. She indicated that "neither [of the agency's affidavits] even attempts to establish that the requested communications between the FBI and various third parties prior to or after the raid are likely to be found in the Central Records System." She observed that "the Court finds the FBI failed to meet its burden to show that the search it conducted was reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant communications between that third parties that could be retrieved by conducting queries for 'Agriprocessors Inc.' or 'Sholom Rubashkin.'" She found that "on several pages the FBI redacted information describing actions taken (or not taken) by third parties that does not appear to identify any third party whose identity might be protected by Exemption 6 or Exemption 7(C). Therefore, the FBI must either revise its redactions or provide a supplemental explanation of the use of Exemptions 6 and 7(C) with respect to [those] pages." Rosenberg challenged the agency's withholding of information about Chief District Court Judge Linda Reade, whom Rosenberg accused of misconduct. But after reviewing Reade's involvement in the case, Kollar-Kotelly commented that "on this record, no reasonable person would belief Chief Judge Reade engaged in misconduct." Upholding several FBI claims under Exemption 7(E), Kollar-Kotelly rejected the agency's 7(E) claim for questions pertaining to an obstruction of justice investigation. She observed that "the FBI offers no explanation as to how revealing the specific questions the agency suggested be asked as part of an investigation of possible obstruction of justice through the placement of a newspaper ad concerning an upcoming trial 'could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law.'"
Opinion/Order [80]Issues: Exemption 7(E) - Investigative methods or techniques, Exemption 7(D) - Confidential sources, Exemption 7(C) - Invasion of privacy concerning law enforcement records FOIA Project Annotation: Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly has ruled that the FBI conducted an adequate search for records pertaining to a multi-part request concerning the investigation and conviction of Sholom Rubashkin for mail fraud and related financial crimes. Kollar-Kotelly also found the FBI had properly invoked Exemption 7(C) (invasion of privacy concerning law enforcement records), Exemption 7(D) (confidential sources), and Exemption 7(E) (investigative methods and techniques) to withhold or redact records. Rubashkin operated Agriprocessors, a kosher meatpacking plant in Postville, Iowa that employed hundreds of illegal immigrants. He was arrested after his plant was raided in 2008 and convicted in 2011. Lawrence Rosenberg, Rubashkin's attorney, submitted a detailed 39-paragraph request to the FBI for records pertaining to the raid of Agriprossessors and Rubashkin's subsequent investigation and conviction, including a lengthy list of 101 individuals. In an earlier decision, Kollar-Kotelly upheld most of the agency's claims but found the agency had not yet adequately explained its search and that a handful of exemption claims had not been adequately justified. This time around, Kollar-Kotelly found the agency had complied except in minor respects. Rosenberg complained the agency had failed to explain why it only searched its Central Records System. But Kollar-Kotelly noted the agency had explained that after searching the CRS there were no indications that responsive records might exist elsewhere. She noted that "courts have consistently held that the results of a search are relevant in so far as the content of the responsive records may indicate potentially responsive records in other unsearched locations." But in this case, the agency found no indications of the existence of other records after searching the CRS. As a result, Kollar-Kotelly observed that "the FBI conducted a broad search for potentially responsive records in the database most likely to contain such records and had no factual basis�"before or after conducting that search�"to believe that responsive documents were likely to be found in any other location." Although Rosenberg complained that the agency continued to withhold too much information under Exemption 7(C), Kollar-Kotelly pointed out that "the FBI's redactions [are] particularly appropriate and necessary to protect the privacy interests of third parties given the small community in which the crime that is the subject of Plaintiff's FOIA request took place." Kollar-Kotelly acknowledged that the agency was able to withhold more information in instances where Exemption 7(D) applied. She agreed with the FBI that many individuals spoke with an implied assurance of confidentiality. She indicated that "the Court finds that the severity of the crime and the close association that certain informants had with Mr. Rubashkin, Agriprocessors, or Mr. Rubashkin's fraudulent activity permit a reasonable inference that for these informants 'the communication in all likelihood would not have been made if confidentiality had not been assured.'" While the FBI had withheld information about reports submitted under the Bank Secrecy Act under Exemption 7(E), Kollar-Kotelly now accepted the agency's suggestion that they were protected under Exemption 3 (other statutes). She noted that "while the FBI's discussion of the BSA was initially offered as a justification for the applicability of Exemption 7(E), the FBI's argument regarding the applicability of the BSA's exemptions as the basis for Exemption 3 is no different. Thus, the Court finds Plaintiff had an opportunity to respond to the argument that is the foundation of the FBI's invocation of Exemption 3. In light of this, and the BSA's clear command that records of BSA reports shall not be disclosed, the Court finds it appropriate to consider the FBI's invocation of Exemption 3 'in order to achieve a just result.'"
Issues: Exemption 7(C) - Invasion of privacy concerning law enforcement records, Exemption 7(E) - Investigative methods or techniques, Adequacy - Search, Exemption 3 - Statutory prohibition of disclosure, Exemption 7(D) - Confidential sources | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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