Case Detail
Case Title | ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER v. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
District | District of Columbia | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
City | Washington, DC | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Case Number | 1:2006cv00096 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Date Filed | 2006-01-19 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Date Closed | 2014-04-01 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Judge | Chief Judge Royce C. Lamberth | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Plaintiff | ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Plaintiff | AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION Originally from Case No. 06-0214 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Plaintiff | AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION Originally from Case No. 06-0214 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Plaintiff | NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE FUND, INC. Originally from Case No. 06-0214 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Case Description | The Electronic Privacy Information Center submitted a FOIA request to the Department of Justice for records concerning a presidential directive authorizing the NSA to conduct surveillance without a FISA court order. EPIC also requested expedited processing. The agency granted EPIC's request for expedited processing, but after hearing nothing further from the agency, EPIC filed suit. Complaint issues: Failure to respond within statutory time limit, Expedited processing, Litigation - Attorney's fees | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Defendant | DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Documents | Docket Complaint Opinion/Order [10] FOIA Project Annotation: Finding that the Justice Department had failed to expedite EPIC's FOIA request for records pertaining to the agency's role in developing the NSA eavesdropping program after 9/11, Judge Henry Kennedy has ordered Justice to process the request within 20 days. In so doing, Kennedy has added some important interpretation on just what it means for an agency to expedite a request and what steps an agency must take after agreeing to expedited processing. Although expedition requests have become more common, there hasn't been much litigation over the expedited processing provisions from the 1996 EFOIA amendments. Most of it has been in the D.C. Circuit and EPIC has taken a lead role in trying to establish plaintiffs' rights to expedited processing. But its current case presents a factual situation that has not been before the courts previously. Whereas most litigation so far has focused on granting expedition â€" challenging an agency's denial to expedite a request â€" the current litigation involves EPIC's attempts to force Justice to actually expedite its request after four different agency components agreed that the request qualified for expedition. On December 16, the day the New York Times broke the story of the eavesdropping program, EPIC filed requests with the Justice Department's Office of the Attorney General, Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, Office of Legal Counsel, and Office of Legal Policy. On December 21, the Office of Information and Privacy responded on behalf of the Attorney General and Legal Policy indicating that the request would be expedited, but noting that "we will be unable to comply with the twenty-working-day time limit in this case." OIPR granted expedition on January 6 and OLC did the same on January 25. When none of the requests had been processed by January 19, EPIC filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, asking Kennedy to order the agency to process the requests expeditiously. Challenging EPIC's entitlement to an injunction, Justice argued such relief was unprecedented and was nothing more than a litigation tactic to "artificially accelerate proceedings in this case." Kennedy disagreed, noting that "DOJ's argument that EPIC acts improperly in seeking a preliminary injunction is unavailing. On numerous occasions, federal courts have entertained motions for a preliminary injunction in FOIA cases and, when appropriate, have granted such motions." He added: "Moreover, the D.C. Circuit has held that '[t]he FOIA imposes no limits on courts' equitable powers in enforcing its terms' and 'unreasonable delays in disclosing non-exempt documents violate the intent and purpose of the FOIA, and the courts have a duty to prevent [such] abuses.' Therefore, the court does not hesitate to consider the merits of EPIC's motion." The EFOIA's expedition provisions do not include a statutory time limit like the 20 working day limit for normal requests, but instead instruct agencies to expedite requests "as soon as practicable." Kennedy recognized that the case turned on the interpretation of this limitation and observed that "there is no dispute that EPIC's FOIA requests are entitled to expedited processing; all four of the DOJ components who received EPIC's requests have so conceded. Rather, the primary dispute between the parties in this matter is the meaning of the statutory language 'as soon as practicable.'" He then noted that "DOJ argues that the 'as soon as practicable' language in the expedited processing provisions should be interpreted to impose no concrete deadline. Rather, according to DOJ, the court should interpret expedition under FOIA to require merely that an agency move a request 'to the head of the line.' Moreover, DOJ insists that courts should defer to an agency's determination that it is giving priority to a request and processing it 'as soon as practicable.'" He indicated that "under DOJ's view of the expedited processing provisions of FOIA, the government would have carte blanche to determine the time line for processing expedited requests, with the courts playing no role whatsoever in the process." He pointed out that at the oral argument "DOJ's counsel suggested that the court and the requestor simply must take at face value an agency's determination that more time is necessary, regardless of the time that has elapsed since the request was filed." Rejecting that claim, Kennedy said that "such a reading runs counter to the language of the statute and relevant case law. FOIA, as amended, envisions the courts playing an important role in guaranteeing that agencies comply with its terms. . .Adopting the government's position â€" that an agency has unfettered discretion to determine how long is practicable for processing expedited requests â€" would require the court to abdicate its 'duty' to prevent 'unreasonable delays in disclosing non-exempt documents.'" He added that "furthermore, relevant case law establishes that courts have the authority to impose concrete deadlines on agencies that delay the processing of requests meriting expedition. These cases implicitly reject the notion that the decision of practicability is to be determined solely by the agency and support the contention that courts have the authority, and perhaps the obligation, to scrutinize closely agency delay." After rejecting DOJ's argument, Kennedy observed that "the court must next determine at what point processing becomes unreasonably delayed such that judicial intervention is appropriate. EPIC asserts that the twenty-day deadline that applies to standard FOIA requests should, at a minimum, also apply to requests meriting expedited processing. As EPIC argues, Congress could not have intended to create the absurd situation wherein standard FOIA requests must be processed within twenty days (unless the agency can show that exceptional circumstances exist for a delay), yet expedited requests empower an agency to unilaterally decide to exceed the standard twenty-day period." He pointed out that the EFOIA legislative history explained that the expedition provisions were intended to "give the request priority for processing more quickly than otherwise would occur." Kennedy indicated that "interpreting FOIA to allow the agency more time than that provided in situations involving standard FOIA requests neither hastens the release of information nor does it allow for processing 'more quickly than otherwise would occur.' For these reasons, this court is of the view that the phrase 'as soon as practicable' in the context of a provision of FOIA allowing for expedited processing, cannot be interpreted to impose a lower burden on the agency than would otherwise exist. . . Therefore, the court concludes that an agency that violates the twenty-day deadline applicable to standard FOIA requests presumptively also fails to process an expedited request 'as soon as practicable.' That is, a prima facie showing of agency delay exists when an agency fails to process an expedited FOIA request within the time limit applicable to standard FOIA requests." Kennedy then indicated that "the presumption of agency delay raised by failing to respond to an expedited request within twenty days is certainly rebuttable if the agency presents credible evidence that disclosure within such time period is truly impracticable. Here, however, DOJ has not attempted to present any evidence that processing EPIC's FOIA requests within twenty days of the receipt of EPIC's requests was impracticable or that processing the complaint within the time period requested by EPIC in its motion (twenty days from the date this memorandum opinion is filed and three months from the date DOJ received EPIC's FOIA request) is not practicable." DOJ also argued that EPIC would not be irreparably harmed if the preliminary injunction was granted because, by being granted expedition, it had already gotten everything to which it was entitled. But Kennedy noted that "this argument stretches the limits of plausibility. EPIC's right to expedition is certainly not satisfied by DOJ's decision to give priority to EPIC's requests. What matters to EPIC is not how the requests are labeled by the agency, but rather when the documents are actually released. . .Unless the requests are processed without delay, EPIC's right to expedition will be lost." Kennedy added that DOJ's initial determination to expedite the requests undercut its claim. "Given this concession, the court finds it hard to accept DOJ's current argument that disclosure is not urgent and that further delay will not harm EPIC." Finally, Kennedy dismissed the agency's claim that expedited processing of the request might lead to inadvertent disclosure of exempted documents. He noted that "Congress has already weighed the value of prompt disclosure against the risk of mistake by an agency and determined that twenty days is a reasonable time period, absent exceptional circumstances, for an agency to properly process standard FOIA requests. Here, DOJ has not yet made any specific showing that it will not be able to process the documents within the time period sought by EPIC. Vague suggestions that inadvertent release of exempted documents might occur are insufficient to outweigh the very tangible benefits the FOIA seeks to further â€" government openness and accountability."
Opinion/Order [48]Issues: Expedited processing - Time limit FOIA Project Annotation: Judge Henry Kennedy has ruled that the government has not yet substantiated its justifications for withholding records pertaining to its warrantless surveillance program. While finding that many of the records were protected by either Exemption 1 (national security), Exemption 3 (other statutes), or Exemption 5 (deliberative process privilege), Kennedy indicated that the Justice Department had failed to substantiate claims for other records, including any explanation of why documents were not segregable. Referring to records from the Office of Legal Counsel described as pertaining to targets of the surveillance program, Kennedy noted that "because the language used by OLC is both vague and expansive, the court is not in a position to determine segregability at all, for the simple reason that the court has no way of knowing what any of the records in this category actually are. Nor, therefore, is the court empowered to determine whether the records are protected by the deliberative process privilege. All the court can surmise is the nature of a portion of what these records contain, and that is simply not sufficient for purposes of summary judgment." Finding a claim of deliberative process privilege to be inadequately explained, Kennedy observed that "while the court is certainly sensitive to the government's need to protect classified information and its deliberative processes, essentially declaring 'because we say so' is an inadequate method for invoking Exemption 5." Kennedy rejected the agency's claim that the number of pages produced was protected. He pointed out that "the notion that the lawyers at OLC will be inhibited in the free exchange of recommendations, advice and analysis if they knew the number of pages they use to express themselves could be disclosed to the public is implausible, and DOJ's assertion that revealing the volume of final memoranda in OLC's possession related to TSP and similar activities will somehow reveal the actual scope and/or the workings of the government's classified surveillance activities has no foundation in the record." Kennedy found the affidavit submitted by the National Security Agency was no more descriptive. He observed that "the NSA declarations leave the court with no way to assess the appropriateness of the withholding decision as to records within this category."
Opinion/Order [67]Issues: Litigation - Segregability analysis, Litigation - Vaughn index, Exemption 5 - Privileges FOIA Project Annotation: Exemption 5 (privileges) is perhaps the most opaque of all the FOIA exemptions as written. But after being endlessly interpreted by the courts, its coverage encompasses a handful of widely-recognized privileges�"deliberative process privilege, attorney-client privilege, and attorney work product privilege. While other privileges have occasionally been found to fit under Exemption 5 as well, these three privileges are by far the most commonly claimed and litigated. Two recent decisions, however, indicate that the analysis for determining exactly why a record fits under one of the privileges is still more unsettled than one might expect. The cases involved two sophisticated litigators�"CREW and EPIC�"and while the subject matter of the requests was significantly different, both by their terms requested information that could be characterized as advice or recommendations. CREW asked the National Archives and Records Administration for records pertaining to the agency record status of the White House Workers and Visitors Entrance System records and EPIC requested information about the Justice Department's warrantless surveillance program. Judge Reggie Walton ultimately rejected most of CREW's Exemption 5 arguments, but he did decide to review two NARA memos concerning the retention of WAVES records in camera after concluding that NARA had failed to adequately explain how they were deliberative in nature. CREW argued that the memos reflected "legal views of NARA's general counsel on questions regarding the transfer and disposition of WAVES records" and that the memos "were [not] created by NARA to formulate policy, but rather represent NARA's discharge of its statutory duty to act on agency proposals regarding the disposition of its records." Finding the agency had not sufficiently described the memos, Walton pointed out that "it is not clear from the Vaughn Index what role the documents played in the administrative process. In addition, it is not clear from the filings whether the documents were prepared in contemplation of litigation." On the other hand, Walton found that several documents dealing with the disposition of WAVES records were protected as attorney work product. Although the threshold for protection under the attorney work product is that the records were created in anticipation of pending litigation, Walton pointed out that "here, the defendant could reasonably have anticipated litigation over the question of whether WAVES and related records were presidential or federal, considering that FOIA requests for these records had already been submitted. Further, the documents were written by one of the defendant's attorneys or sent to him as the defendant's General Counsel in response to specific questions counsel posed related to the legal status of WAVES records." He added that "they concern written communications between [NARA General Counsel Gary] Stern and NARA archivists or Amy Krupsky, a NARA attorney, (1) regarding what further actions should be taken by NARA staff with respect to WAVES records schedule and (2) the status of a possible meeting planned with White House, DOJ counsel, and Secret Service staff to discuss pending legal issues related to the transfer and disposition of WAVES records. Disclosure of such written communications would clearly disclose the mental impressions of NARA's General Counsel, including his plan and legal theories concerning the transfer and disposition of WAVE records." While Walton's description sounds like legal advice given by NARA attorneys, its connection to any litigation�"the key requirement for the privilege�"seems a bit of a stretch. Walton essentially accepts that litigation was inevitable because frequent litigators like CREW and Judicial Watch had made FOIA requests. A FOIA request does not litigation make and if agencies can invoke attorney work product protection for opinions that deal with an agency's response to a FOIA request then virtually anything can be characterized as being created in anticipation of litigation. EPIC tried to convince Judge Henry Kennedy that opinions from the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel were not protected by the deliberative process privilege because they were final opinions binding on executive branch agencies. Kennedy rejected the claim, noting instead that "it is nonsensical to state that legal opinions can never be protected by the deliberative process privilege because of their authoritative nature. If legal opinions are disclosable simply because they are authoritative or conclusive, this 'would mean that virtually all legal advice OLC provides to the executive branch would be subject to disclosure.' This would significantly chill the ability of the executive branch to obtain legal advice. Rather, authoritative legal opinions promulgated as part of a larger decision-making process may well be protected by the deliberative process privilege." While Kennedy found that most of the OLC memos were probably protected by the deliberative process privilege, he agreed with EPIC that the agency's affidavits failed to describe the deliberative process involved and ordered the agency to make those memos available for in camera review. Kennedy rejected Justice's claim of attorney-client privilege. He noted that "it is not the case that just because the documents at issue contain classified information the documents are protected by the attorney-client privilege. The attorney-client privilege protects confidential information that involves or is about that client. The [agency's] declarations do not indicate what agency or executive branch entity is the client for purposes of the attorney-client privilege. . .Simply because the documents contain legal advice does not necessarily mean that the attorney-client privilege applies to the documents." He added that "the court has no doubt that, to the extent DOJ became privy to classified information, there was an expectation that DOJ was to keep this information confidential. The attorney-client privilege is not necessarily the means for protecting this information." Kennedy ruled that three documents that had been sent to the president or his immediate advisors were protected by the presidential communications privilege. EPIC had argued that the president was required to invoke the privilege himself, a claim that had already been rejected by several courts, including the D.C. Circuit, in previous ruling focusing on the scope of the presidential communications privilege. He also rejected EPIC's claim that the presidential communications privilege was restricted to advisory or deliberative documents. He explained that "EPIC appears to confuse the presidential communications privilege with the deliberative process privilege�"they are two separate privileges. Indeed, the D.C. Circuit has noted that the presidential communications privilege applies to documents that may not be covered by the deliberative process privilege�"the D.C. Circuit has found that the privilege applies to 'final and post-decisional materials as well as pre-deliberative ones.'"
Opinion/Order [91]Issues: Exemption 5 - Privileges - Deliberative process privilege - Deliberative, Exemption 5 - Privileges - Attorney-client privilege FOIA Project Annotation: Judge Royce Lamberth ruled that Office of Legal Counsel memoranda concerning the Bush-era warrantless wire-tapping program is protected by Exemption 1 (national security) and Exemption 5 (deliberative process privilege). After reviewing the ten documents withheld by the Justice Department in responses to requests by EPIC and the ACLU, Lamberth noted that the documents "are properly classified" and "each record contains confidential, pre-decisional legal advice protected by the deliberative-process and attorney-client communications privilege." He pointed out that the D.C. Circuit's recent decision in EFF v. Dept of Justice finding an OLC memo prepared for the FBI could be withheld entirely under Exemption 5 was dispositive. He observed that "this Court sees no principled way to distinguish the OLC opinion in the Electronic Frontier Foundation case from the ten OLC memoranda in this case."
Issues: Exemption 5 - Privileges, Exemption 1 - Harm to national security | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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