Case Detail
Case Title | PEOPLE FOR THE AMERICAN WAY FOUNDATION v. NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY/CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
District | District of Columbia | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
City | Washington, DC | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Case Number | 1:2006cv00206 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Date Filed | 2006-02-06 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Date Closed | 2006-11-20 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Judge | Judge Ellen S. Huvelle | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Plaintiff | PEOPLE FOR THE AMERICAN WAY FOUNDATION | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Case Description | People for the American Way Foundation submitted a FOIA request to the National Security Agency for 16 categories of records concerning its secret surveillance program. PAWF also requested expedited processing and a fee waiver. The agency acknowledged receipt of its request, but after hearing nothing further from the agency, People for the American Way Foundation filed suit. Complaint issues: Failure to respond within statutory time limit, Litigation - Attorney's fees | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Defendant | NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY/CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Documents | Docket Complaint Opinion/Order [21] Opinion/Order [22] FOIA Project Annotation: Just when it appeared as though the courts had become friendlier towards press and public interest requesters trying to untangle the alleged abuses of the Bush administration during its war on terrorism, along comes a wake-up call reminding requesters that the intelligence community has some impenetrable defenses in the form of Exemption 3 statutes. The most common and widely-used of these is the National Security Act's provision protecting CIA sources and methods, but this time around People for the American Way has discovered that the National Security Agency has its own Exemption 3 statute whose protection is every bit as deep and broad as is that afforded the CIA. In a case trying to find out more about the NSA's "terrorist surveillance" program, Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle has ruled in favor of the agency, finding that Section 6 of the National Security Agency of 1959, 50 U.S.C. § 402 note, allows the agency to withhold virtually all the information about the program, regardless of the possibility that it may be illegal. People for the American Way submitted a multi-part request, but ultimately indicated that it was willing to "accept a full list of the domestic wiretaps or other electronic surveillance conducted by the NSA and the number of persons subject to that surveillance within the requested time frame under the authority granted by the [President's] Order, with the names of the targeted individuals and organizations redacted." The agency denied the request, saying that the information related "to the sensitive activities and functions of the NSA, and [that its] disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause grave damage to national security." The agency also indicated that it could not "in the interest of national security, confirm or deny the existence of records responsive to [the organization's request for records relating to itself] because confirmation or denial of the NSA's surveillance of any particular target 'would allow our adversaries to accumulate information and draw conclusions about NSA's technical capabilities and methods.'" Section 6 of the NSA Act of 1959 provides that "nothing in this Act or any other law. . .shall be construed to require the disclosure of the organization or any function of the National Security Agency, [or] of any information with respect to the activities thereof." The NSA had submitted the affidavit of Joseph B., who oversees the signal intelligence operations at the agency. He testified that the agency had responsive records, including some "briefing slides" that "detail information related to the number of individuals subject to surveillance, contain the identity of some individuals, and contain information related to the number of communications intercepted under the TSP." He indicated that disclosure of such statistics "would reveal information about NSA's success or lack or success in implementing TSP" as well as "information about the U.S. intelligence community's capabilities, priorities, and activities." Based on the affidavit, Huvelle said she was satisfied that "defendant's declarations have described the withheld documents and information in a reasonably specific fashion and have put forth a rational explanation for their withholding under Section 6 and Exemption 3. The NSA has averred that all the requested information concerns a specific NSA activity â€" intelligence gathering based on 'the collection of electronic communications' â€" and has logically explained that the disclosure of this material would reveal information related to that NSA activity." She noted that People for the American Way had failed to rebut the agency's explanation and instead had argued that there would be no harm in disclosing most of the information, arguing that "the NSA's own characterization of its activities does not explain how they are so 'fragile' as to preclude the disclosure of the total number of individuals and communications subject to the NSA's secret surveillance program." In response, Huvelle explained why Exemption 3 statutes are so highly favored by the intelligence community. She pointed out that "the law regarding Section 6 does not require the NSA to demonstrate what harm might result from the disclosure of its activities. 'A specific showing of potential harm to national security . . . is irrelevant to the language of [Section 6]. Congress has already, in enacting the statute, decided that the disclosure of NSA activities is potentially harmful.'" People for the American Way argued that the surveillance program had been found unconstitutional by a federal court in Detroit and that Section 6 could not be invoked to protect illegal activity. Huvelle, however, pointed out that "while the Court agrees that the scope of Section 6 is not without limits, it need not grapple with the problem of defining those limits here, for the well-established operation of Section 6, which forbids disclosure of information relating to the NSA's SIGINT activities, is not implicated by the ongoing debate regarding the legality of the TSP. Whether the TSP, one of the NSA's many SIGINT programs involving the collection of electronic communications, is ultimately determined to be unlawful, its potential illegality cannot be used in this case to evade the 'unequivocal' language of Section 6, which 'prohibits the disclosure of information relating to the NSA's functions and activities . . .'" The agency also claimed Exemption 1 (national security) to protect some information and People for the American Way fared no better under its standards and the existing case law. People for the American Way argued that "release of only 'bare statistics' and the information relating solely to whether it has been the target of surveillance could not reasonably be expected to result in the damage to the national security that defendant proclaims." People for the American Way also argued that a provision of Executive Order 12958 on classification provided for a public interest balancing in some circumstances. But Huvelle indicated that "plaintiff, however, misconstrues the statutes and well-established case law. Under Exemption 1 and the plain language of Executive Order 12958, that balancing does not rest with the Court but belongs exclusively to the agency. . . The Court's role with regard to Exemption 1 is only to review the sufficiency and reasonableness of the agency's explanation for its classification decision, giving the agency's determination the heightened deference it is due under the law." She also rejected the argument that records could not be classified to conceal violations of law. She pointed out that "even if the TSP were ultimately determined to be illegal, it does not follow that the NSA's decision regarding the classification of materials relating to the TSP was made 'in order to . . . conceal violations of law.' Because of the deference due to the NSA in matters of national security, and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the Court must accept defendant's reasonable explanation that the materials were classified in order to prevent damage to the national security."
Issues: Exemption 3 - Statutory prohibition of disclosure | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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